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	The	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-2008	 clearly	 illustrated	 that	 some	 mortgage	borrowings	 became	 not	 only	 a	 curse	 for	 investors,	 but	 equally	 for	 individual	households	with	a	mortgage	and	for	all	home	owners;	for	the	employed	who	lost	their	jobs,	for	pension	funds	and	last	but	not	least	for	the	U.S.	government	which	saw	its	debt	levels	skyrocket.		The	 fund	 providers	 were	 not	 only	 local	 U.S.	 banks,	 but	 also	 pension	 funds,	investors	 in	 mortgage-backed	 securities	 and	 other	 fund	 providers.	 These	providers	 did	 not	 just	 originate	 from	 within	 the	 United	 States,	 but	 also	 from	many	 overseas	 countries.	 	 Money	 invested	 in	 U.S.	 mortgage-backed	 securities	came	from	around	the	world	and	this	resulted	in	a	crisis	in	the	U.S.	becoming	an	international	financial	pandemic.		Why	did	the	crisis	occur,	how	did	 it	happen	and	what	could	have	been	done	to	avoid	it	happening?			The	prevailing	wisdom	in	the	years	1997-2007	was	that	house	price	rises	in	the	U.S.	were	 the	result	of	 supply	and	demand	 factors	and	 therefore	should	not	be	the	 subject	 of	 government	 intervention.	 The	 2007-2008	 financial	 crisis	disabused	the	world	of	that	notion	in	a	dramatic	fashion.		The	main	driver	of	 the	crisis	was	 the	use	of	borrowed	funds	 to	acquire	homes,	rather	 than	personal	 savings.	Buyers’	 (and	bankers’	 funding)	 sentiment	was	 to	buy	with	(mostly)	borrowed	funds,	relying	on	a	predicted	rise	in	house	prices	to	compensate	 for	 the	 interest	 costs.	 The	 prevailing	 interest	 rates	 mattered	 less	than	the	potential	gains.		Over	 the	 period	 1997-2005	 the	 net	 annual	 increase	 in	 outstanding	 mortgage	amounts	 rose	 from	$216	billion	 in	 1997	 to	 $1.054	 trillion	 in	 2005.	During	 the	same	period	 the	net	annual	 increase	 in	household	 real	 estate	values	 rose	 from	$210	 billion	 in	 1997	 to	 $3.014	 trillion	 in	 2005.	 Homebuyers	 seemed	 to	 have	made	a	wise	decision	during	these	years.		What	was	overlooked,	however,	was	what	 the	economy	could	bear	 in	 terms	of	borrowed	 funds	 as	 compared	 to	 its	National	 Income	 (or	 its	 near	 equivalent	 of	GDP).	In	1997	outstanding	mortgage	levels	were	$3.75	trillion	and	nominal	GDP	$8.6	 trillion.	 In	 2006	 mortgage	 levels	 reached	 $9.9	 trillion	 and	 nominal	 GDP	$13.9	trillion.	The	macro-economic	ratio	of	debt	to	income	had	risen	from	43.6%	in	1997	to	71.2%	in	2006.				A	dynamic	yet	stable	debt-to-income	level	offers	the	best	prospects	for	economic	growth,	not	just	in	one	year,	but	also	over	the	long	run.																																																																																																											
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1997	 		3.753	 					216	 5.25-5.50	 				210	
1998	 		4.055	 					302	 5.56-4.68	 					836	
1999	 		4.431	 				376	 4.63-5.30	 					946	
2000	 		4.814	 					383	 5.45-6.40	 			1572	
2001	 		5.322	 					508	 5.98-1.82	 			1354	
2002	 		6.028	 				706	 1.73-1.24	 			1298	
2003	 		6.910	 					882	 1.24-0.98	 			1618	
2004	 		7.859	 					949	 1.00-2.16	 			2511	
2005	 		8.913	 		1054	 2.28-4.16	 			3014	
2006	 		9.910	 					997	 4.29-5.24	 					509	
2007	 10.613	 					703	 5.25-4.24	 -		1813	
2008	 10.580	 -						33	 3.94-0.16	 -		3197	
2009	 10.419	 -				161	 0.15-0.12	 -				454	
2010	 		9.921	 -				498	 0.11-0.18	 -				555	
2011	 		9.702	 -				219	 0.17-0.07	 -				293	
2012	 		9.491	 -				211	 0.08-0.16	 				1412	
2013	 		9.401	 -						90	 0.14-0.09	 				2102	
2014	 		9.400	 -								1	 0.07-0.12	 				1096	
2015	 		9.491	 							91	 0.11-0.24	 				1255			
1.2	The	risk	assessment	process		As	mentioned	 above,	 the	 growth	 in	 the	 collective	 U.S.	 mortgage	 portfolio	 was	extremely	 fast	 over	 the	 period	 1997-2007.	 The	 collective	 level	 increased	 from	$3.75	trillion	in	19971	to	$10.61	trillion	in	2007.	By	2007	the	level	of	outstanding	mortgage	 loans	 had	 overtaken	 the	U.S.	 government	 debt	 level,	 the	 latter	 being	$9.00	 trillion	 by	 30	 September	 2007.	 Long-term	 household	 debt	 had	 become	larger	than	government	debt.			What	was	striking	was	the	assessment	of	 the	collective	value	of	all	homes	over	the	 same	 period.	 The	 Federal	 Reserve	 publishes	 data	 on	 owner’s	 equity2	in	homes.	 In	 Q1	 1997	 the	 equity	 level	 amounted	 to	 $4.925	 trillion,	 while	 by	 Q1	2006	the	equity	level	had	increased	to	$13.267	trillion.																																																												1	https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HMLBSHNO	2	https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/HMLBSHNO	
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																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Compare	 these	 figures	 to	 U.S.	 GDP	 in	 nominal	 terms.	 At	 year-end	 1997,	 home	equity	 valuation	 was	 $5.105	 trillion	 compared	 to	 nominal	 U.S.	 GDP	 of	 $8.6	trillion.	In	2006	home	equity	valuation	had	shot	up	to	$13.267	trillion	while	U.S	nominal	GDP	had	grown	to	$13.9	trillion.	The	home	asset	values	as	compared	to	U.S.	output	had	increased	from	57.3%	in	1997	to	95.4%	in	2006.		Nominal	GDP	(=National	Income)	did	grow	by	54.3%	over	the	period	1997-2006,	but	home	asset	values	increased	by	159.9%	over	the	same	period;	nearly	three	times	 the	 speed	 of	 income	 growth.	 On	 an	 individual	 basis,	 no	 household	 can	afford	to	increase	long-term	borrowings	by	264%	(from	$3.753	trillion	in	1997	to	 $9.910	 trillion	 in	 2006)	when	 total	 income	 grows	 by	 only	 54.3%.	However,	this	 is	 exactly	 what	 happened	 in	 macro-economic	 terms	 in	 the	 U.S.	 over	 the	period	1997-2006.		It	is	instructive	to	pause	and	consider	what	home	asset	values	reflect.	A	realized	price	 for	 a	 particular	 sale	 of	 a	 home	 is	 just	 one	 transaction.	 However	 not	 all	existing	homes	are	sold	in	a	single	year	and	new	homes	are	added	to	the	stock	of	homes.	For	the	U.S.,	rough	estimates	indicate	that	perhaps	between	7	and	10%	of	the	 total	 housing	 stock	 comes	 on	 the	market	 in	 a	 single	 year.	 From	 a	macro-economic	 perspective,	 multiplying	 the	 total	 housing	 stock	 with	 the	 prices	achieved	for	selling	a	small	number	of	homes	can	be	very	be	misleading.			The	values	of	the	total	housing	stock	are	not	wrong,	but	are	not	right	either.	The	values	 do	 not	 reflect	 the	 income	 earning	 levels,	 which	 lie	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	repayment	 risk	 relating	 to	 mortgage	 loans.	 When	 National	 Income	 grows	 by	54.3%	over	the	period	1997-2006	and	the	housing	stock	values	grow	by	159.9%	over	 the	 same	 period,	 it	 is	 not	 that	 the	 National	 Income	 has	 been	 assessed	wrongly,	 but	 that	 the	 link	 between	 income	 and	 home	 value	 levels	 has	 broken	down.		If	each	buyer	would	have	had	to	use	his/hers	own	savings	to	buy	a	home,	there	could	not	have	been	a	break	in	the	link	between	income	and	values.	It	is	with	the	help	of	outside	funds	-home	mortgages-	that	this	link	can	break.	Such	a	scenario	becomes	accepted	reality	when	the	speed	of	mortgage	lending	growth	outstrips	the	macro-economic	income	growth.	Money,	as	in	personal	savings,	does	in	itself	not	provide	 any	danger	 to	 the	housing	market.	However	borrowed	money	 can	make	the	difference	between	steady	economic	growth	and	boom-bust	scenarios.		Financial	 risks	 on	 home	 mortgages	 were	 accumulated	 too	 rapidly	 over	 the	period	 1997-2006	 relative	 to	 income	 growth.	 The	 shift	 away	 from	 a	 direct	lender-borrower	relationship	through	securitization	of	assets	held	by	groups	of	borrowers	 and	 remote	 lenders	 further	 complicated	 the	picture	 and	 from	2004	securitization	 efforts	 were	 ramped	 up.	 Another	 complicating	 factor	 was	 the	acceleration	 in	 selling	 sub-prime	mortgages	 from	2004	 onwards.	However	 the	amounts	 involved	 were	 never	 more	 than	 $1.3	 trillion	 out	 of	 a	 total	 mortgage	portfolio	of	just	over	$10	trillion.	The	spark	that	set	off	the	financial	crisis	in				
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																																																																																																							Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			August	 2007	 may	 have	 been	 BNP	 Paribas’	 action	 to	 bar	 investors	 from	withdrawing	 money	 from	 three	 of	 its	 investment	 funds	 that	 held	 securities	backed	 by	 U.S.	 subprime	mortgages,	 but	 this	was	 just	 a	 symptom	 and	 not	 the	cause	of	the	crisis.	The	real	cause	was	that	the	accumulation	of	mortgage	lending	over	the	period	1997-2006	which	caused	house	prices	to	increase	at	a	speed	that	far	outpaced	 the	growth	 in	 the	National	 Income	 in	 the	U.S.	 and	 the	 increase	 in	income	levels	was	far	outpaced	by	house	price	increases.			
1.3	Why	did	the	interest	instrument	not	achieve	its	goals?	
	The	 Federal	 Reserve’s	 interest	 rate	 policy	 was	 not	 aimed	 at	 containing	 the	increase	in	households’	real	estate	values.	It	was	aimed	at	keeping	output	prices	at	a	growth	level	no	greater	than	2%	annually.	It	was	also	aimed	at	creating	the	right	environment	for	the	U.S.	economy	to	grow	and	keep	unemployment	levels	as	low	as	possible.		Why	did	the	interest	rate	policies	applied	by	the	Fed	not	prevent	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis?		The	main	reason	was	that	individual	households	behaved	in	a	manner,	 just	like	companies	do	frequently.	If	the	costs	of	borrowing	are	compared	to	the	potential	gains	 to	 be	 made	 by	 investing	 in	 a	 home	 –or	 in	 the	 case	 of	 companies	 in	 an	activity-	 than	 it	matters	 less	what	 the	 price	 of	 borrowing	 is	 –the	 interest	 rate	applicable-	 but	 what	 gains	 may	 be	 expected	 from	 the	 borrowed	 amount.	 For	many	homebuyers	a	current	known	cost	element	–the	interest	rate	payable-	was	set	 off	 against	 a	 potential	 future	 gain.	 Some	 people	 may	 call	 this	 speculation;	others	will	argue	that	it	is	a	well-considered	choice	based	on	market	history.		As	Table	1	shows,	in	each	year	from	1998-2005	the	annual	increase	in	mortgage	borrowing	was	much	 lower	 than	 the	 increase	 in	 annual	 household	 real	 estate	values.	 In	2005	 the	$1.054	 trillion	 in	net	new	borrowings	 led	 to	an	 increase	 in	household	 real	 estate	 values	 of	 $3.014	 trillion.	 Little	 wonder	 that	 many	households	were	enticed	to	 invest	 in	property,	notwithstanding	the	 increase	 in	effective	Fed	funds	rate	from	2.28%	to	4.16%	in	2005.		In	Ben	S.	Bernanke’s	book3:	 ‘The	courage	to	act’	 the	Fed’s	considerations	about	the	 causes	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	 are	 exhaustively	 spelt	 out.	 Mr.	 Bernanke	acknowledges	 that	 high	 mortgage-lending	 levels	 might	 have	 resulted	 in	homeowners’	 real	 estate	 values	 to	 growing	 at	 an	 even	 faster	 speed.	 The	 latter	values	exceeded	National	 Income	growth	by	 three	 times	over	 the	period	1998-2005.	 The	macro-economic	 source	 of	 repayments	 for	 all	 debts	 is	 the	 National	Income	level.	When	income	levels	fell	materially	behind	the	home	value	growth																																																												3	http://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?ID=4294989041	
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	With	hindsight	some	relatively	easy	observations	are	possible.	Was	it	the	role	of	an	 individual	 bank	 to	 curtail	 its	mortgage-lending	book,	when	 the	 competition	was	 expanding	 their	 mortgage	 book?	 Of	 course,	 every	 institution	 had	 an	obligation	 to	 its	 shareholders	 to	 maximize	 profits	 within	 specified	 risk	 limits.	The	 point	 is	 that	 the	 collective	 of	 banks	 created	 the	 outstanding	 mortgage	lending	levels,	not	just	one	or	another	bank.	If	the	rise	in	the	U.S.	mortgage	loan	book	was	too	rapid	over	the	period	1997-2005	–which	it	was-	then	it	would	have	been	 logical	 that	 the	 regulators	 would	 have	 invented	 solutions	 to	 curb	 such	lending	rather	than	punish	individual	banks.	As	explained	in	the	previous	section	just	moving	the	Fed	funds	rate	up	and	down	would	have	been	rather	ineffective	because	of	the	popular	sentiment	toward	the	housing	market.		The	volume	growth	 in	outstanding	mortgage	 loans	over	 the	period	1997-2006	may	have	been	 the	 logical	 consequence	of	banking	competition	 since	no	 single	bank	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 collective	 growth.	 The	 growth	 level	was	 too	 fast	with	the	value	of	household	real	estate	holdings	far	outstripping	National	Income	growth.		Only	the	banking	supervisory	authorities	could	have	taken	measures	to	slow	down	such	lending	patterns,	but	with	the	ineffectual	exception	of	adjusting	Fed	funds	rates	occasionally,	they	failed	to	act.		Some	banks	in	their	hunger	for	profits	resorted	to	more	dubious	practices,	which	significantly	increased	the	severity	of	the	crisis.	From	2004,	banks	in	their	drive	for	 short	 term	profits	 increasingly	 started	 to	 sell	 sub-prime	mortgages,	 not	 on	the	basis	of	their	client’s	creditworthiness,	but	pinned	on	the	hope	that	the	rise	in	house	prices	would	 cover	 their	 risks.	 If	 a	 client	defaulted	under	 a	mortgage	loan	 agreement,	 a	 sale	 of	 the	 house	would	 return	 the	 loan	 proceeds.	 In	 effect	banks	 started	 to	 act	 like	 a	 large	 number	 of	 their	 customers.	 They	 focused	 on	future	asset	values	rather	than	on	income	affordability	by	the	borrower.	Among	others	‘interest	only’	mortgages	were	offered,	 ‘teaser	rates’	were	offered	with	a	below	market	starting	up	interest	rate	for	some	two	years	followed	by	a	big	hike	in	rates	thereafter.		The	 volume	 growth	 of	 the	 collective	 home	 mortgage	 book	 is	 a	 logical	consequence	 of	 having	 banks	 compete	 with	 one	 another.	 Banks	 cannot	 and	should	not	be	blamed	for	responding	to	a	competitive	environment.	However,	it	became	 a	 different	matter	when	banks	no	 longer	 based	 their	 creditworthiness	assessment	on	 the	 income	 level	 of	 the	borrower	but	on	potential	 future	house	prices.	 The	widespread	 use	 of	 subprime	mortgages	 from	2004	 onwards	was	 a	classical	example	of	banks	moving	the	goal	posts.		With	 the	 effect	 of	 amplifying	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 crisis,	 banks	 also	 engaged	 in	securitization	 of	 mortgage	 portfolios.	 Securitization	 severs	 the	 link	 between	lender	 and	 borrower.	 It	 combines	 and	 repackages	 pools	 of	 underlying	mortgages,	which	is	then	offered	to	investors.	It	is	widely	accepted	that	credit																																																																																																						
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																																																																																															Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		rating	agencies	did	a	pretty	poor	job	in	assessing	the	risks	of	such	securities.	The	global	distribution	of	these	securities	by	the	banks,	internationalized	the	funding	element	of	the	U.S.	mortgage	portfolio.	Group	risks	on	mortgagors,	poor	work	by	the	 credit	 rating	agencies	and	overseas	 involvement	 in	 the	 funding	element	all	constituted	factors	that	made	the	financial	crisis	more	difficult	to	contain	than	it	would	 otherwise	 have	 been.	 Again	 the	 U.S.	 banking	 supervisors	 did	 not	 act	against	the	face	of	these	emerging	risks.					
3	 The	 actual	 and	 potential	 policy	 responses	 to	 the	 2007-2008	 financial	
crisis	
	In	addition	 to	 lowering	 the	Fed	 funds	 rate	 in	2008	 to	 its	 lowest	 level	 ever,	 the	Fed	reacted	to	the	crisis	by	supporting	many	banks	and	some	other	specialized	financial	 institutions	by	providing	 liquidity	 to	 these	 financial	sector	companies.	Some	were	beyond	salvation,	such	as	Lehman	Brothers;	others	like	nearly	all	the	big	banks	needed	this	support	to	survive.	In	2007-2008	banks	did	not	trust	other	banks	 and	 therefore	 hoarded	 liquidity	 instead	 of	 smoothing	 out	 daily	 liquidity	ups	 and	 downs	 between	 themselves.	 The	 downward	 spiral	 of	 increasing	mortgage	loan	defaults	combined	with	falling	house	prices	put	a	great	strain	on	bank	equity	levels.		Providing	liquidity	to	financial	market	participants	became	a	major	objective	for	the	Fed	during	the	initial	crisis	period.	In	this	effort	the	Fed	did	have	the	courage	to	act	 and	did	 it	under	great	 stress.	Every	day	during	 this	period	brought	new	challenges.			In	 2009	 and	 following	 years,	 the	 Fed	 launched	 a	 series	 of	 purchases	 of	 U.S.	government	and	mortgage	bonds,	ultimately	to	the	extent	of	some	$4.3	trillion;	Quantitative	Easing.	The	aim	was	to	inject	funds	into	these	markets,	so	that	the	banking	 sector	 was	 enabled	 to	 lend	 more	 to	 their	 customers.	 As	 Table	 1	illustrates	this	injection	of	funds	bypassed	the	individual	households	altogether	as	 household’s	 aim	 was	 to	 restore	 each	 individual	 own	 balance	 sheet	 before	taking	on	new	loans.	What	the	purchases	also	brought	about	was	to	lower	long-term	interest	rates	to	the	lowest	interest	rates	on	record.	According	to	the	most	recent	Fed	Balance	sheet4,	 it	 still	holds	some	$4.245	 trillion	 in	securities	on	 its	books.	 The	 Fed	 neutralizes	 this	 liquidity	 provision	 by	 offering	 banks	 the	opportunity	 to	deposit	 surplus	 funds	with	 the	Fed.	 It	pays	a	positive	spread	 to	the	banks	over	short-term	U.S.	government	securities.	With	any	 increase	 in	the	Fed	funds	rate	these	payments	will	increase	and	affect	negatively	the	profits	the	Fed	will	transfer	to	the	U.S.	Treasury.		In	 connection	with	 individual	 households,	what	 the	 Fed	 and	 others	 regulators	seem	to	have	missed	was	to	study	and	subsequently	act	upon	the	link	between	the	National	Income	developments	and	the	Household	Real	Estate	values.																																																											4	http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm#h41tab1	
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																																																																																																				Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	could	have	been	done	differently?	A	number	of	tools	could	have	been	used	and	 they	 can	 still	 have	 a	 place	when	 the	 next	 gyration	 in	 the	 housing	market	occurs.																																																																																																							
3.1.	Set	up	an	early	warning	system	
	An	 ‘early	 warning’	 system	 could	 be	 installed	 which	 sounds	 an	 alarm	 once	 it	becomes	 clear	 that	 house	 price	 increases	 are	 running	 much	 faster	 than	 the	National	 Income	growth.	 Such	a	 system	could	use	 ‘traffic	 lights’	 to	warn	banks	that	caution	is	required.		Green	would	 indicate	 that	 the	mortgage	markets	 are	 not	 growing	 too	 fast	 and	may	 continue	 to	 grow	 until	 further	 notice.	 Amber	 for	 when	 the	 speed	 of	mortgage	 lending	 growth	 is	 becoming	 excessive	 and	 signaling	 that	 lenders	should	slow	down	their	 lending	volumes	with	red	reserved	for	when	mortgage	volumes	 are	 growing	 too	 fast.	 The	 Fed	 could	 indicate	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 the	mortgage	 market	 may	 safely	 grow.	 Any	 institution	 exceeding	 such	 speed	 of	growth	might	be	penalized	as	it	risks	undermining	the	volume	targets	needed	to	avoid	a	boom-bust	situation.		Banks	cannot	be	expected	to	stop	mortgage	lending	volumes	to	grow	voluntarily,	hence	a	simple	but	effective	 traffic	management	system	helps	 to	avoid	 that	 the	U.S.	economy	will	not	return	to	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	situation	again.		A	 structural	 weakness	 in	 banking	 supervision	 would	 have	 to	 be	 overcome	 as	regulatory	oversight	was	and	to	some	extent	still	is	divided	over	the	12	Federal	Reserve	banks	and	various	State	organizations.	The	Federal	Reserve	could	be	put	in	charge	operating	such	warning	and	traffic	management	system.				
3.2.	Set	up	a	home	mortgage	quality	control	system	
	Banks	and	other	financial	institutions	are	very	adept	in	developing	products	that	help	 their	profits	rise	 in	 the	short	 term.	Subprime	mortgages	and	 ‘teaser’	 rates	are	just	a	few	of	the	examples	that	come	to	mind.	Mortgage	backed	securitization	is	 another	 example.	 There	 is	 nothing	 wrong	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 finding	investors	other	than	banks	to	fund	mortgage	portfolios.	However	the	practice	as	executed	in	the	U.S.	from	2004-2007	left	much	to	be	desired.		Banks	may	prefer	their	freedom	of	the	markets,	but	market	freedoms	should	not	come	with	a	price	tag	for	society	as	a	whole,	which	is	at	odds	with	the	benefit	of	the	entrepreneurial	freedoms	acquired.	For	instance	it	cannot	be	right	that	over	the	 period	 2006-2013	 as	 a	 result	 of	 bad	 bank	 practices	 21.3	 million	 U.S.	households	were	confronted	with	foreclosure	proceedings	or	nearly	45%	of	all																																																																																																				
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	Mortgage	 lending	 was	 at	 the	 amber	 level	 in	 2002-2003.	 The	 policy	 measures	needed	at	 that	point	would	have	been	 twofold:	 to	 introduce	a	product	 liability	system	for	banks	and	introduce	a	macro-economic	reserve	policy	(MERP).		Most	companies,	when	they	sell	a	product,	provide	a	guarantee	that	the	product	will	 operate	 satisfactorily	 during	 the	 lifetime	 of	 the	 product.	 Banks	 cannot	guarantee	 that	 the	 home	 mortgage	 client	 will	 not	 default	 on	 home	 mortgage	payments.	However	the	amber	stage	in	home	mortgage	lending	indicates	that	the	net	 volume	growth	 in	new	 lending	 is	 reaching	a	dangerous	pitch.	The	Fed	and	with	it	all	other	bank	and	financial	sector	regulators	could	stipulate	that	any	new	home	 mortgage	 requires	 a	 financial	 reserve	 set	 aside	 within	 the	 originating	institution	at	 a	higher	 level	 than	 the	previous	one.	For	 instance,	 if	 3%	was	 the	expectation	of	the	annual	level	of	doubtful	debtors	before	the	amber	stage,	the																																																										5	http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/203740.pdf	6	http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/search?startMonth=12&startDay=31&startYear=2007&endMonth=12&endDay=31&endYear=2015	
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• The	philosophy	that	house	price	rises	in	the	U.S.	were	the	result	of	supply	and	 demand	 factors	 and	 therefore	 should	 not	 be	 the	 subject	 of	government	intervention	turned	out	to	be	an	erroneous	one	as	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	testified.		
• The	main	reason	was	that	borrowed	funds	were	used	to	acquire	homes,	rather	than	personal	savings.			
• Over	the	period	1997-2005	the	net	annual	volume	increase	in	borrowed	funds	 for	 home	 acquisitions	 multiplied	 from	 $216	 billion	 in	 1997	 to	$1.054	trillion	in	2005;	a	nearly	fivefold	increase	in	borrowed	funds.		
• The	 net	 annual	 increase	 in	 household	 real	 estate	 values	 rose	 over	 the	period	1997-2005	from	$210	billion	in	1997	to	$3.014	trillion	in	2005;	an	increase	of	over	14	times.		
• Between	2001	and	2006	many	households	in	taking	out	mortgages	based	their	 decisions	 on	 the	 known	 interest	 rate	 charges	 and	 compared	 these	with	the	potential	price	increases	of	their	acquired	home:	the	household	sentiment	factor.	Not	the	income	level	but	the	potential	opportunity	of	a	substantial	value	gain	drove	the	house	market.		
• Banks	 helped	 to	 perpetuate	 these	 sentiments.	 The	 strong	 push	 of	subprime	mortgages	from	2004	onwards	–interest	only	and	teaser	rates	mortgages	for	instance-	were	the	wrong	products	at	the	wrong	time.	The	securitization	 of	 such	 mortgages	 increased	 the	 macro-economic	 risks	further,	 by	 turning	 long-term	 risks	 into	 a	 daily	 tradable	 risk.		Securitization	also	caused	the	internationalization	of	the	risks.		
• Subprime	mortgages	 were	 not	 stopped	 by	 the	 regulators	 nor	 were	 the	securitization	of	these	products;	the	legislation	in	place	did	not	deal	with	macro-economic	 disturbances,	 but	 only	with	misselling	 of	mortgages	 to	individual	households.		
• In	macro-economic	 terms	 if	 the	 growth	 in	National	 Income	 is	 far	 lower	than	the	growth	in	long-term	borrowings,	the	level	of	doubtful	debtors	is	bound	to	increase	dramatically.		
• The	 Fed	 and	 other	 regulators	 could	 have	 acted	 differently.	 Their	conventional	tool	base	comprised	mainly	of	the	Fed	funds	rate,	which	was	not	 meant	 to	 deal	 with	 house	 price	 increases.	 Even	 if	 it	 had	 done	 so,	moving	 interest	 rates	 would	 not	 have	 been	 effective	 as	 the	 household	sentiment	factor	was	strong	and	based	on	future	gains	in	house	prices.		 	
	 17	
	 																																																																																		Helicopter	money	or	a	risk	sharing	approach?	©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		
• More	 effective	 tools	 that	 could	 have	 been	 deployed	 include	 the	 “early	warning	 or	 traffic	 light	 system”,	 a	 “home	 mortgage	 quality	 control	system”,	and	a	“Macro-economic	reserve	policy	system”.	The	latter	system	would	move	new	reserves	away	from	the	banking	system	into	a	protected	account	with	the	Fed,	so	as	to	protect	the	public	at	large	from	the	costs	of	recessions	caused	by	the	lending	excess.		
• Finally	a	“National	Mortgage	Bank”	could	be	set	up	to	help	households	as	a	 lender	of	 last	resort	 in	order	to	stretch	out	mortgage	payments	over	a	longer	period	of	time	and	overcome	the	threat	of	a	forced	sale	of	homes.	An	element	of	“helicopter	money”	could	be	combined	with	a	subordinated	claim	on	the	property.		
• The	use	of	helicopter	money	in	a	targeted	approach	such	as	via	a	National	Mortgage	Bank	should	be	the	preferred	approach	rather	than	helping	all	households	 indiscriminately.	 A	 shared	 risk	 approach	 between	 a	government,	 the	 banks	 and	 the	 household	 sector	 provides	 the	 best	strategy	for	averting	another	financial	crisis.		
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